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CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991. The Civil Rights 
Act of 1991 stands as the most far-reaching and 
controve rsial civil rights enactment since the CIV IL. 
RI( ; ~rrS ACT OF 1964. Ranging from racial harassment 
to age discrimination to numerical proofs of discrimi-
nation (disparate impact) to attorney fees, the 1991 act 
covered most aspects of equal-employment legislation 
and litigation . The breadth of this legislation, not 
surprisingly, brought with it sharp divisions among 
civil rights, business, and governmen tal interests. Most 
significant , the Bush White House strongly opposed 
significant features of th e legislative re form effort-
resultin g in a success ful veto of a 1990 civil rights 
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package a,nd marathon negotiations that preced ed the 
President s eventual support of the 1991 act. 
The 1991 act was a matte r of great moment to the 
~ourts as well as ~o the Wh.ite House and Congress. 
fhrough thIs legislation , nme Suprerne Court d .. _ 
. (d·d d f· eCi 
slons eCi e Tom 1986 to 1991) were either modi-
fied or re.versed . These d ecisions involved issues of 
statutory mterpret~1tiOl? and, consequently , could be 
ove~· t.urned by legislative enactment. That so man y 
deCISions wer~ overturned , however , signaled strong 
dl:"pleasure With the Supreme Court. Most significa nt, 
of the sponsors act sought to clarify and expand the 
sco~e and.s~eep. of Title Vll of the 1964 Civil Rights 
~ct s. provIsions fo~ employment-discrimination litiga-
tion 111 the .w.ake of three controve rsial 1989 Supreme 
Court d eCiSions. One decision , Price Walerhouse v. 
Hopkins ( .198~) , h.e1~ th~t an employer who engages in 
p~.rposet ul dlscnmll1atlOn can nonetheless escape lia-
bility by provll1g that motives not prohibited by Title 
VIl wou~d have otherwise caused the adverse employ-
ment action. A second decision, M arlin v. Wilks (1989), 
held that pe~son s not parties to litigation can challenge 
the terms of court-approved agreements between de-
fendant employers and plaintiff employees . Th ird , 
and most significant, WaTds Cove v . Alonio (1989), 
required a disparate-impact plaintiff to bear the bur-
den of persuasion ~oth in identifying the challenged 
employment practICe and d emonstrating that the 
practice does not significantly serve "the legitimate 
employment goals" of the defendant em ployer. The 
focus of the battle over the 1991 act was how these and 
other Court d ecisions should be modified. 
The battle proved to be an epic, lasting twenty 
months and including one presidential veto and 
countless counterproposals and compromises. The 
principal division centered on whether disparate-im-
pact lawsuits would encourage employers to engage in 
quota hiring in order to stave off costly li tigation 
rooted in numerical proofs of d iscrimination. Presi-
dent Bush vowed that he would not sign a "quota bill" 
and, in 1990, he vetoed proposed legislation for pre-
cisely this reason. Clairn ing in his veto message that 
"the bill actually employs a maze of highly legalistic 
language to introduce the destructive force o f quotas 
into our Nation's employment system" and that "[i]t is 
neithe r fair nor sensible to give th e employers of our 
country a difficult choice between using quotas and 
seeking a clarification of the law th rough costly and 
very r isky litigation," Bush concluded that "equal op-
portunity is not advanced but thwarted." 
Bush's antiquota attack was subject to doubt. Legis-
lation that Bush sent to Congress contem poraneous 
with his veto was nearly identical to the legislation he 
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vetoed on the disparate-impact issue. On race-exclu-
sive scholarships, minority-business set-asides, and dis-
parate-impact proof5 contained in the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, moreover, Bush spoke of this longstand-
ing commitment to AFFIRMATIVE ACTION. The President, 
nevertheless , was successful in his antiquota veto. 
Bush pe rsisted in opposing the 1991 Civi l Rights Act 
as "a quota bill. " Along with White House Counsel C. 
Boyden Gray, Attorney General Dick Thornburgh , 
and Chief of Staff John Sununu, the administration 
fi e rcely opposed the 199 1 act. A compromise was 
eventually reached, howeve r. On the rights of pe rsons 
not. parties to litigation, the avai labi lity of jury trials 
and punitive damages, and several other issues, the 
Bush adm inistration acceded to congressional spon-
sors. On the disparate-impact issue, the act was pur-
posefully opaque. While noting that Supreme Court 
decisions prior to the 1989 Wards Cove ruling would 
become the governing standard, ambiguities in these 
decisions made this a legislative compromise in wh ich 
both sides could honestly proclaim victory . By not 
es tablishing a definitive standard, moreover, the judi-
ciary will have broad latitude to redefine disparate-
impact proofs. 
The willingness of President Bush to sign the 1991 
act is an outgrowth of events occurring in the weeks 
before the announced compromise. Specifically, 
form er Ku Klux Klansman David Duke d efeated in-
cumbent Governor Buddy Roemer as Louisiana 's Re-
publican candidate for governor and, more signiti-
cant, Clarence Thomas, Bush's choice to re place 
Thurgood Marshall on the Supreme Court, was sub-
ject to allegations of sex ual harassment. A veto of civil 
rights legislation in the wake of these events wou ld 
have proven difficult:, especially since severa l moder-
ate Re publicans notified Bush that they would not 
support him in a veto-override fight. 
The 199 1 act is a by-product of compromise and 
circumstances. The purposeful ambiguity of critical 
provisions, 1Il0reove r, reveals that t.wo years of negoti-
ation cou ld not yie ld a de finitive resolution of the 
con fli ctin g desires of the elected branches. Ironica ll y, 
legislatioll spurred on by dissa tisfaction with Supreme 
Court d ecisioll makin g will on ly become clear in the 
wake of judicial interpretation. 
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